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On the Reconstruction of Face Images from
Deep Face Templates
Guangcan Mai, Kai Cao, Pong C. Yuen∗, Senior Member, IEEE, and Anil K. Jain, Life Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—State-of-the-art face recognition systems are based on deep (convolutional) neural networks. Therefore, it is imperative to
determine to what extent face templates derived from deep networks can be inverted to obtain the original face image. In this paper, we
study the vulnerabilities of a state-of-the-art face recognition system based on template reconstruction attack. We propose a neighborly
de-convolutional neural network (NbNet) to reconstruct face images from their deep templates. In our experiments, we assumed that
no knowledge about the target subject and the deep network are available. To train the NbNet reconstruction models, we augmented
two benchmark face datasets (VGG-Face and Multi-PIE) with a large collection of images synthesized using a face generator. The
proposed reconstruction was evaluated using type-I (comparing the reconstructed images against the original face images used to
generate the deep template) and type-II (comparing the reconstructed images against a different face image of the same subject)
attacks. Given the images reconstructed from NbNets, we show that for verification, we achieve TAR of 95.20% (58.05%) on LFW under
type-I (type-II) attacks @ FAR of 0.1%. Besides, 96.58% (92.84%) of the images reconstructed from templates of partition fa (fb) can
be identified from partition fa in color FERET. Our study demonstrates the need to secure deep templates in face recognition systems.
Index Terms—Face recognition, template security, deep networks, deep templates, template reconstruction, neighborly
de-convolutional neural network.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
FACE recognition systems are being increasingly usedfor secure access in applications ranging from personal
devices (e.g., iPhone X1 and Samsung S82) to access control
(e.g., banking3 and border control4). In critical applications,
face recognition needs to meet stringent performance re-
quirements, including low error rates and strong system
security. In particular, the face recognition system must be
resistant to spoofing (presentation) attacks and template
invertivility. Therefore, it is critical to evaluate the vul-
nerabilities of a face recognition system to these attacks
and devise necessary countermeasures. To this end, several
attack mechanisms (such as hill climbing [1], [2], [3], spoof-
ing [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], and template reconstruction (tem-
plate invertibility) [9]) have been proposed to determine the
vulnerabilities of face recognition systems.
In this paper, we focus on the vulnerability of a face
recognition system to template invertibility or reconstruc-
tion attacks. In a template reconstruction attack (Fig. 1),
we want to determine if face images can be successfully
reconstructed from the face templates of target subjects
and then used as input to the system to access privileges.
Fig. 2 shows examples of face images reconstructed from
their deep templates by the proposed method. Some of
these reconstructions are successful in that they match well
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Fig. 1. Face recognition system vulnerability to template reconstruction
attacks. Face image of a target subject is reconstructed from the corre-
sponding template to gain system access by (a) creating a fake face (for
example, a 2D printed image or 3D mask) (blue box) or (b) injecting a
reconstructed face image directly into the feature extractor (red box).
with the original images (Fig. 2 (a)), while others are not
successful (Fig. 2 (b)). Template reconstruction attacks gen-
erally assume that templates of target subjects and the corre-
sponding black-box template extractor can be accessed. These
are reasonable assumptions because: (a) templates of target
users can be exposed in hacked databases5,6, and (b) the
corresponding black-box template extractor can potentially
be obtained by purchasing the face recognition SDK. To
our knowledge, almost all of the face recognition vendors
store templates without template protection, while some of
them protect templates with specific hardware (e.g., Secure
Enclave on A11 of iPhone X [10], TrustZone on ARM7).
Note that unlike traditional passwords, biometric templates
cannot be directly protected by standard ciphers such as
AES and RSA since the matching of templates needs to
allow small errors caused by intra-subject variations [17],
[18]. Besides, state-of-the-art template protection schemes
5. https://goo.gl/QUMHpv
6. https://goo.gl/KdxzqT
7. https://www.arm.com/products/security-on-arm/trustzone
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TABLE 1
Comparison of major algorithms for face image reconstruction from their corresponding templates
Algorithm Template features Evaluation Remarks
MDS [11] PCA, BIC, COTS Type-I attack
a: TAR of 72% using BICb and 73% using COTSc at an
FAR of 1.0% on FERET
Linear model with limited
capacity
RBF
regression [9] LQP [12]
Type-II attackd: 20% rank-1 identification error rate on FERET;
EER = 29% on LFW;
RBF model may have
limited generative capacity
CNN [13] Final feature ofFaceNet [14]
Reported results were mainly based on visualizations and no
comparable statistical results was reported
White-box template
extractor was assumed
Cole et. al., [15]
Intermediate
feature of
FaceNet [14]e
High-quality images (e.g.,
front-facing, neutral-pose)
are required for training.
This paper Final feature ofFaceNet [14]
Type-I attack: TARf of 95.20% (LFW) and 73.76% (FRGC v2.0) at an
FAR of 0.1%; rank-1 identification rate 95.57% on color FERET
Type-II attack: TAR of 58.05% (LFW) and 38.39% (FRGC v2.0) at
an FAR of 0.1%; rank-1 identification rate 92.84% on color FERET
Requires a large number of
images for network training
a Type-I attack refers to matching the reconstructed image against the face image from which the template was extracted.
b BIC refers to Bayesian intra/inter-person classifier [16].
c COTS refers to commercial off-the-shelf system. A local-feature-based COTS was used in [11].
d Type-II attack refers to matching the reconstructed image against a face image of the same subject that was not used for template creation.
e Output of 1024-D ‘avgpool’ layer of the “NN2” architecture.
f TAR for LFW and FRGC v2.0 cannot be directly compared because their similarity thresholds differ.
0.84 0.78 0.82 0.93
(a) Successful match
0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13
(b) Unsuccessful match
Fig. 2. Example face images reconstructed from their templates using
the proposed method (VGG-NbB-P). The top row shows the original
images (from LFW) and the bottom row shows the corresponding recon-
structions. The numerical value shown between the two images is the
cosine similarity between the original and its reconstructed face image.
The similarity threshold is 0.51 (0.38) at FAR = 0.1% (1.0%).
are still far from practical because of the severe trade-off
between matching accuracy and system security [19], [20].
Face templates are typically compact binary or real-
valued feature representations8 that are extracted from face
images to increase the efficiency and accuracy of similar-
ity computation. Over the past couple of decades, a large
number of approaches have been proposed for face repre-
sentations. These representations can be broadly categorized
into (i) shallow [12], [21], [22], and (ii) deep (convolutional
neural network or CNN) representations [14], [23], [24], ac-
cording to the depth of their representational models9. Deep
representations have shown their superior performances in
face evaluation benchmarks (such as LFW [25], YouTube
Faces [14], [26], and NIST IJB-A [24], [27]). Therefore, it is
imperative to investigate the invertibility of deep templates
to determine their vulnerability to template reconstruction
attacks. However, to the best of our knowledge, no such
work has been reported.
In our study of template reconstruction attacks, we made
no assumptions about subjects used to train the target face
recognition system. Therefore, only public domain face im-
ages were used to train our template reconstruction model.
8. As face templates refer to face representations stored in a face
recognition system, these terms are used interchangeably in this paper.
9. Some researchers [23] refer to shallow representations as those that
are not extracted using deep networks.
The available algorithms for face image reconstruction from
templates [9], [11]10, [13], [15] are summarized in Table 1.
The generalizability of the published template reconstruc-
tion attacks [9], [11] is not known, as all of the training and
testing images used in their evaluations were subsets of the
same face dataset. No statistical study in terms of template
reconstruction attack has been reported in [13], [15].
To determine to what extent face templates derived from
deep networks can be inverted to obtain the original face
images, a reconstruction model with sufficient capacity is
needed to invert the complex mapping used in the deep
template extraction model [28]. De-convolutional neural
network (D-CNN)11 [29], [30], [31] is one of the straight-
forward deep models for reconstructing face images from
deep templates. To design a D-CNN with sufficient model
capacity12, one could increase the number of output chan-
nels (filters) in each de-convolution layer [32]. However, this
often introduces noisy and repeated channels since they are
treated equally during the training.
To address the issues of noisy (repeated) channels and
insufficient channel details, inspired by DenseNet [33] and
MemNet [34], we propose a neighborly de-convolutional net-
work framework (NbNet) and its building block, neighborly
de-convolution blocks (NbBlocks). The NbBlock produces
the same number of channels as a de-convolution layer
by (a) reducing the number of channels in de-convolution
layers to avoid the noisy and repeated channels; and (b) then
creating the reduced channels by learning from their neigh-
boring channels which were previously created in the same
block to increase the details in reconstructed face images. To
train the NbNets, a large number of face images are required.
Instead of following the time-consuming and expensive pro-
cess of collecting a sufficiently large face dataset [35], [36],
10. MDS method in the context of template reconstructible was
initially proposed for reconstructing templates by matching scores
between the target subject and attacking queries. However, it can also
be used for template reconstruction attacks [11].
11. Some researchers refer to D-CNNs as CNNs. However, given that
its purpose is the inverse of a CNN, we distinguish D-CNN and CNN.
12. The ability of a model to fit a wide variety of functions [28].
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we trained a face image generator, DCGAN [37], to augment
available public domain face datasets. To further enhance
the quality of reconstructed images, we explore both pixel
difference and perceptual loss [38] for training the NbNets.
In summary, this paper makes following contributions:
• An investigation of the invertibility of face templates
generated by deep networks. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first such study on security and privacy of face
recognition systems.
• An NbNet with its building block, NbBlock, was devel-
oped for reconstructing face images from deep templates.
The NbNets were trained by data augmentation and per-
ceptual loss [38], resulting in maintaining discriminative
information in deep templates.
• Empirical results show that the proposed face image
reconstruction from the corresponding templates is success-
ful. We show that we can achieve the following, verification
rates (security), TAR of 95.20% (58.05%) on LFW under
type-I (type-II) attack @ FAR of 0.1%. For identification
(privacy), we achieve 96.58% and 92.84% rank one accuracy
(partition fa) in color FERET [39] as gallery and the images
reconstructed from partition fa (type-I attack) and fb (type-II
attack) as probe.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we describe the current practice of storing
face templates, the limitations of current methods for recon-
structing face images from deep templates and introduce
GANs for generating (synthesizing) face images.
2.1 Face Template Security
Unlike traditional passwords that can be matched in their
encrypted or hash form with standard ciphers (e.g., AES,
RSA, and SHA-3), face templates cannot be simply protected
by standard ciphers because of the intra-subject variations
in face images [17], [18]. Due to the avalanche effect13 [40] of
standard ciphers, the face templates protected by standard
ciphers need to be decrypted before matching. This intro-
duces another challenge, (decryption) key management. In
addition, decrypted face templates can also be gleaned by
launching an authentication attempt.
Face template protection remains an open challenge. To
our knowledge, either the vendors ignore the security and
privacy issues of face templates, or secure the encrypted
templates and the corresponding keys in specific hardware
(e.g., Secure Enclave on A11 of iPhone X [10], TrustZone
on ARM14). Note that the requirement of specific hardware
limits the range of biometric applications.
2.2 Reconstructing Face Images from Deep Templates
Face template reconstruction requires the determination of
the inverse of deep models used to extract deep templates
from face images. Most deep models are complex and are
typically implemented by designing and training a network
with sufficiently large capacity [28].
Shallow model based [9], [11]: There are two shal-
low model based methods for reconstructing face images
13. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avalanche effect
14. https://www.arm.com/products/security-on-arm/trustzone
from templates proposed in the literature: multidimensional
scaling (MDS) [11] and radial basis function (RBF) regres-
sion [9]. However, these methods have only been evaluated
using shallow templates. The MDS-based method [11] uses a
set of face images to generate a similarity score matrix using
the target face recognition system and then finds an affine
space in which face images can approximate the original
similarity matrix. Once the affine space has been found, a
set of similarities is obtained from the target face recognition
system by matching the target template and the test face
images. The affine representation of the target template is
estimated using these similarities, which is then mapped
back to the target face image.
Deep model based [13], [15]: Zhmoginov and Sandler
[13] learn the reconstruction of face images from templates
using a CNN by minimizing the template difference be-
tween original and reconstructed images. This requires the
gradient information from target template extractor and
cannot satisfy our assumption of black-box template extrac-
tor. Cole et. al. [15] first estimate the landmarks and textures
of face images from the templates, and then combine the
estimated landmarks and textures using the differentiable
warping to yield the reconstructed images. High-quality
face images (e.g., front-facing, neutral-pose) are required to
be selected for generating landmarks and textures in [15] for
training the reconstruction model. Note that both [13] and
[15] does not aim to study vulnerability on deep templates
and hence no comparable statistical results based template
reconstruction attack were reported.
2.3 GAN for Face Image Generation
With adversarial training, GANs [37], [41], [42], [43], [44],
[45], [46], [47], [48], [49] are able to generate photo-realistic
(face) images from randomly sampled vectors. It has become
one of the most popular methods for generating face images,
compared to other methods such as data augmentation [50]
and SREFI [51]. GANs typically consist of a generator which
produces an image from a randomly sampled vector, and
a discriminator which classifies an input image as real or
synthesized. The basic idea for training a GAN is to prevent
images output by the generator be mistakenly classified as
real by co-training a discriminator.
DCGAN [37] is believed to be the first method that
directly generates high-quality images (64 × 64) from ran-
domly sampled vectors. PPGN [44] was proposed to con-
ditionally generate high-resolution images with better im-
age quality and sample diversity, but it is rather compli-
cated. Wasserstein GAN [45], [46] was proposed to solve
the model collapse problems in GAN [42]. Note that the
images generated by Wasserstein GAN [45], [46] are com-
parable with those output by DCGAN. BEGAN [47] and
LSGAN [48] have been proposed to attempt to address the
model collapse, and non-convergence problems with GAN.
A progressive strategy for training high-resolution GAN is
described in [49].
In this work, we employed an efficient yet effective
method, DCGAN to generate face images. The original
DCGAN [37] is easy to collapse and outputs poor quality
high-resolution images (e.g., 160 × 160 in this work). We
address the above problems with DCGAN (Section 3.6.2).
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Templates 𝒚𝒚black-boxfeature extractor𝒚𝒚 = �𝑓𝑓 𝒙𝒙ttImages 𝒙𝒙
(NbNet training)�𝜃𝜃 = argmin𝜃𝜃 ℒ 𝒙𝒙, 𝜽𝜽 Trainingrandom vectors𝒛𝒛~ 0,1 𝑘𝑘 face image generator 𝒙𝒙 = 𝑟𝑟(𝒛𝒛)Generating face images
Testing
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with templates 𝒚𝒚𝒕𝒕Reconstructed images 𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕′
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Subjects in target system Target Face Recognition System
Normal flow:    
Attack flow:
Fig. 3. An overview of the proposed system for reconstructing face images from the corresponding deep templates.
3 PROPOSED TEMPLATE SECURITY STUDY
An overview of our security study for deep template based
face recognition systems under template reconstruction at-
tack is shown in Fig. 3; the normal processing flow and
template reconstruction attack flows are shown as black
solid and red dotted lines, respectively. This section first
describes the scenario of template reconstruction attack
using an adversarial machine learning framework [52]. This
is followed by the proposed NbNet for reconstructing face
images from deep templates and the corresponding training
strategy and implementation.
3.1 Template Reconstruction Attack
The adversarial machine learning framework [52], [54] cate-
gorizes biometric attack scenarios from four perspectives: an
adversary’s goal and his/her knowledge, capability, and at-
tack strategy. Given a deep template based face recognition
system, our template reconstruction attack scenario using
the adversarial machine learning framework is as follows.
• Adversary’s goal: The attacker aims to impersonate a
subject in the target face recognition system, compromising
the system integrity.
• Adversary’s knowledge: The attacker is assumed to have
the following information. (a) The templates yt of the target
subjects, which can be obtained via template database leak-
age or an insider attack. (b) The black-box feature extractor
y = fˆ(x) of the target face recognition system. This can
potentially be obtained by purchasing the target face recog-
nition system’s SDK. The attacker has neither information
about target subjects nor their enrollment environments.
Therefore, no face images enrolled in the target system can
be utilized in the attack.
• Adversary’s capability:(a) Ideally, the attacker should
only be permitted to present fake faces (2D photographs
or 3D face masks) to the face sensor during authentication.
In this study, to simplify, the attacker is assumed to be able
to inject face images directly into the feature extractor as if
the images were captured by the face sensor. Note that the
injected images could be used to create fake faces in actual
attacks. (b) The identity decision for each query is available
to the attacker. However, the similarity score of each query
cannot be accessed. (c) Only a small number of trials (e.g.,
< 5) are permitted for the recognition of a target subject.
• Attack strategy: Under these assumptions, the attacker
can infer a face image xt from the target template yt using a
reconstruction model xt = gθ(yt) and insert reconstructed
image as a query to access the target face recognition system.
The parameter θ of the reconstruction model gθ(·) can be
learned using public domain face images.
3.2 NbNet for Face Image Reconstruction
3.2.1 Overview
An overview of the proposed NbNet is shown in Fig. 4 (a).
The NbNet is a cascade of multiple stacked de-convolution
blocks and a convolution operator, ConvOp. De-convolution
blocks up-sample and expand the abstracted signals in the
input channels to produce output channels with a larger
size as well as more details about reconstructed images.
With multiple (D) stacked de-convolution blocks, the NbNet
is able to expand highly abstracted deep templates back
to channels with high resolutions and sufficient details for
generating the output face images. The ConvOp in Fig. 4 (a)
aims to summarize multiple output channels of D-th de-
convolution block to the target number of channels (3 in
this work for RGB images). It is a cascade of convolution,
batch-normalization [53], and tanh activation layers.
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DconvOP 𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋𝑑𝑑−1𝑤𝑤×ℎ×𝑐𝑐𝑋𝑋𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤′×ℎ′×𝑐𝑐′
(b) Typical de-convolution block
𝑋𝑋𝑑𝑑−1𝑤𝑤×ℎ×𝑐𝑐𝑋𝑋𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤′×ℎ′×𝑐𝑐′
(d) Neighborly de-convolution block B 
DconvOP 𝑑𝑑 ConvOP 𝑑𝑑1 ConvOP 𝑑𝑑2 ConvOP 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃⋯Concatenation𝑋𝑋𝑑𝑑−1𝑤𝑤×ℎ×𝑐𝑐𝑋𝑋𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤′×ℎ′×𝑐𝑐′(c) Neighborly de-convolution block A DconvOP 𝑑𝑑 ConvOP 𝑑𝑑1 ConvOP 𝑑𝑑2 ConvOP 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃⋯ConcatenationDe-convolution Block 𝐷𝐷De-convolution Block 𝑑𝑑De-convolution Block 1𝑋𝑋𝑑𝑑−1⋮⋮ 𝑋𝑋𝑑𝑑Input TemplateConvOp
(a) Overview
Black-box 
Feature 
Extractor
Fig. 4. The proposed NbNet for reconstructing face images from the corresponding
face templates. (a) Overview of our face reconstruction network, (b) typical de-
convolution block for building de-convolutional neural network (D-CNN), (c) and (d) are
the neighborly de-convolution blocks (NbBlock) A/B for building NbNet-A and NbNet-
B, respectively. Note that ConvOP (DconvOP) denotes a cascade of a convolution
(de-convolution), a batch-normalization [53], and a ReLU activation (tanh in ConvOP
of (a)) layers, where the width of ConvOp (DconvOP) denotes the number of channels
in its convolution (de-convolution) layer. The black circles in (c) and (d) denote the
channel concatenation of the output channels of DconvOP and ConvOPs.
(a) D-CNN
(b) NbNet-A
(c) NbNet-B
Fig. 5. Visualization of 32 output channels of the 5th de-
convolution blocks in (a) D-CNN, (b) NbNet-A, and (c)
NbNet-B networks, where the input template was extracted
from the bottom image of Fig. 4 (a). Note that the four rows
of channels in (a) and the first two rows of channels in (b)
and (c) are learned from channels from the corresponding
4th block. The third row of channels in both (b) and (c) are
learned from their first two rows of channels. The fourth row
of channels in (b) is learned from the third row of channels
only, where the fourth row of channels in (c) is learned from
the first three rows of channels.
3.2.2 Neighborly De-convolution Block
A typical design of the de-convolution block [29], [37],
as shown in Fig. 4 (b), is to learn output channels with
up-sampling from channels in previous blocks only. The
number of output channels c′ is often made large enough to
ensure sufficient model capacity for template reconstruction
[32]. However, the up-sampled output channels tend to
suffer from the following two issues: (a) noisy and repeated
channels; and (b) insufficient details. An example of these
two issues is shown in Fig. 5 (a), which is a visualization
of output channels in the fifth de-convolution block of a
D-CNN that is built with typical de-convolution blocks.
The corresponding input template was extracted from the
bottom image of Fig. 4 (a).
To address these limitations, we propose NbBlock which
produces the same number of output channels as typical
de-convolution blocks for the face template reconstruction.
One of the reasons for noisy and repeated output channels
is that a large number of channels are treated equally in
a typical de-convolution block; from the perspective of
network architecture, these output channels were learned
from the same set of input channels and became the input
of the same forthcoming blocks. To mitigate this issue, we
first reduce the number of output channels that is simultane-
ously learned from the previous blocks. We then create the
reduced number of output channels with enhanced details
by learning from neighbor channels in the same block.
Let Gd(·) denote the d-th NbBlock, which is shown as
the dashed line in Fig. 4 (a) and is the building compo-
nent of our NbNet. Suppose that Gd(·) consists of one de-
convolution operator (DconvOP) N ′d and P convolution
operators (ConvOPs) {Ndp |p = 1, 2, · · · , P}. Let X ′d and
Xd,p denote the output of DconvOP N ′d and p-th ConvOP
Ndp in d-th NbBlock Gd(·), then
Xd = Gd(Xd−1) = [XP ] (1)
where Xd−1 denotes the output of the (d − 1)-th NbBlock,
[·] denotes a function of channel concatenation, and XP is
the set of outputs of DconvOP and all ConvOPs in Gd(·),
XP = {X ′d, Xd,1, Xd,2, · · · , Xd,P } (2)
where X ′d and Xd,p denotes the output of DconvOP and the
p-th ConvOP in d-th block, resp., and satisfy
X ′d = N ′d (Xd−1) , Xd,p = Ndp
(
[Xˆp]
)
(3)
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where Xˆp is a non-empty subset of Xp.
Based on this idea, we built two NbBlocks, A and B,
as shown in Figs. 4 (c) and (d), where the corresponding
reconstructed networks are named NbNet-A and NbNet-
B, respectively. In this study, the DconvOp (ConvOp) in
Figs. 4 (b), (c), and (d) denotes a cascade of de-convolution
(convolution), batch-normalization [53], and ReLU activa-
tion layers. The only difference between blocks A and B is
the choice of Xˆp,
Xˆp =

{X ′d}, blocks A & B with p = 1;
{Xd,p−1}, block A with p > 1;
Xp, block B with p > 1.
(4)
In our current design of the NbBlocks, half of output chan-
nels ( c
′
2 for block d) are produced by a DconvOP, and the
remaining channels are produced by P ConvOPs, each of
which gives, in this study, eight output channels (Table. 2).
Example of blocks A and B with 32 output channels are
shown in Figs. 5 (b) and (c). The first two rows of channels
are produced by DconvOp and the third and fourth rows
of channels are produced by the first and second ConvOps,
respectively. Compared with Fig. 5 (a), the first two rows in
Figs. 5 (b) and (c) have small amount of noise and fewer
repeated channels, where the third and fourth row provide
channels with more details about the target face image
(the reconstructed image in Fig. 4 (a)). The design of our
NbBlocks is motivated by DenseNet [33] and MemNet [34].
3.3 Reconstruction Loss
Let us denote R (x,x′) as the reconstruction loss be-
tween an input face image x and its reconstruction x′ =
gθ
(
fˆ(x)
)
, where gθ(·) denotes an NbNet with parameter θ
and fˆ(·) denotes a black-box deep template extractor.
Pixel Difference: A straightforward loss for learning
reconstructed image x′ is pixel-wise loss between x′ and
its original version x. The Minkowski distance could then
be used and mathematically expressed as
Rpixel (x,x′) = ||x− x′||k =
(
M∑
m=1
|xm − x′m|k
) 1
k
(5)
where M denotes number of pixels in x and k denotes the
order of the metric.
Perceptual Loss [38]: Because of the high discriminabil-
ity of deep templates, most of the intra-subject variations
in a face image might have been eliminated in its corre-
sponding deep template. The pixel difference based recon-
struction leads to a difficult task of reconstructing these
eliminated intra-subject variations, which, however, are not
necessary for reconstruction. Besides, it does not consider
holistic contents in an image as interpreted by machines and
human visual perception. Therefore, instead of using pixel
difference, we employ the perceptual loss [38] which guides
the reconstructed images towards the same representation
as the original images. Note that a good representation is
robust to intra-subject variations in the input images. The
representation used in this study is the feature map in the
VGG-19 model [55]15. We empirically determine that using
15. Provided by https://github.com/dmlc/mxnet-model-gallery
the output of ReLU3 2 activation layer as the feature map
leads the best image reconstruction, in terms of face match-
ing accuracy. Let F (·) denote feature mapping function
of the ReLU3 2 activation layer of VGG-19 [55], then the
perceptual loss can be expressed as
Rpercept (x,x′) = 1
2
||F (x)− F (x′)||22 (6)
3.4 Generating Face Images for Training
To successfully launch an template reconstruction attack on
a face recognition system without knowledge of the target
subject population, NbNets should be able to accurately
reconstruct face images with input templates extracted from
face images of different subjects. Let px(x) denote the
probability density function (pdf) of image x, the objective
function for training a NbNet can be formulated as
arg min
θ
L (x,θ) = arg min
θ
∫
R (x,x′) px(x)dx
= arg min
θ
∫
R
(
x, gθ(fˆ(x))
)
px(x)dx.
(7)
Since there are no explicit methods for estimating px(x),
we cannot sample face images from px(x). The common
approach is to collect a large-scale face dataset and approxi-
mate the loss function L(θ) in Eq. (7) as:
L(x,θ) = 1
N
N∑
i
R
(
xi, gθ(fˆ(xi))
)
(8)
where N denotes the number of face images and xi denotes
the i-th training image. This approximation is optimal if,
and only if, N is sufficiently large. In practice, this is not
feasible because of the huge time and cost associated with
collecting a large database of face images.
To train a generalizable NbNet for reconstructing face
images from their deep templates, a large number of face
images are required. Ideally, these face images should come
from a large number of different subjects because deep face
templates of the same subject are very similar and can be
regarded as either single exemplar or under large intra-user
variations, a small set of exemplars in the training of NbNet.
However, current large-scale face datasets (such as VGG-
Face [23], CASIA-Webface [56], and Multi-PIE [57]) were
primarily collected for training or evaluating face recogni-
tion algorithms. Hence, they either contain an insufficient
number of images (for example, 494K images in CASIA-
Webface) or an insufficient number of subjects (for instance,
2,622 subjects in VGG-Face and 337 subjects in Multi-PIE)
for training a reconstruction NbNet.
Instead of collecting a large face image dataset for
training, we propose to augment current publicly available
datasets. A straightforward way to augment a face dataset
is to estimate the distribution of face images px(x) and
then sample the estimated distribution. However, as face
images generally consist of a very large number of pixels,
there is no efficient method to model the joint distribution of
these pixels. Therefore, we introduced a generator x = r(z)
capable of generating a face image x from a vector z with
a given distribution. Assuming that r(z) is one-to-one and
smooth, the face images can be sampled by sampling z. The
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TABLE 2
Network details for D-CNN and NbNets. “[k1 × k2, c] DconvOP (ConvOP), stride s”, denotes cascade of a de-convolution (convolution) layer with c
channels, kernel size (k1, k2) and stride s, batch normalization, and ReLU (tanh for the bottom ConvOP) activation layer.
Layer name Output size(c× w × h) D-CNN NbNet-A, NbNet-B
input layer 128× 1× 1
De-convolution
Block (1) 512× 5× 5 [5× 5, 512] DconvOP, stride 2
[5× 5, 256] DconvOP, stride 2
{[3× 3, 8] ConvOP, stride 1}×32
De-convolution
Block (2) 256× 10× 10 [3× 3, 256] DconvOP, stride 2
[3× 3, 128] DconvOP, stride 2
{[3× 3, 8] ConvOP, stride 1}×16
De-convolution
Block (3) 128× 20× 20 [3× 3, 128] DconvOP, stride 2
[3× 3, 64] DconvOP, stride 2
{[3× 3, 8] ConvOP, stride 1}×8
De-convolution
Block (4) 64× 40× 40 [3× 3, 64] DconvOP, stride 2
[3× 3, 32] DconvOP, stride 2
{[3× 3, 8] ConvOP, stride 1}×4
De-convolution
Block (5) 32× 80× 80 [3× 3, 32] DconvOP, stride 2
[3× 3, 16] DconvOP, stride 2
{[3× 3, 8] ConvOP, stride 1}×2
De-convolution
Block (6) 16×160×160 [3× 3, 16] DconvOP, stride 2
[3× 3, 8] DconvOP, stride 2
{[3× 3, 8] ConvOP, stride 1}×1
ConvOP 3× 160× 160 [3× 3, 3] ConvOP, stride 1
Loss layer 3× 160× 160 Pixel difference or perceptual loss [38]
loss function L(θ) in Eq. (7) can then be approximated as
follows:
L (x,θ) =
∫
R
(
x, gθ(fˆ(x))
)
px(x)dx
=
∫
R
(
r(z), gθ
(
fˆ(r(z))
))
pz(z)dz.
(9)
where pz(z) denotes the pdf of variable z. Using the change
of variables method [58], [59], it is easy to show that pz(z)
and r(z) have the following connection,
pz(z) = px(r(z))
∣∣∣∣det(dxdz
)∣∣∣∣ ,where(dxdz
)
ij
=
∂xi
∂zj
.
(10)
Suppose a face image x ∈ Rh×w×c of height h, width w,
and with c channels can be represented by a real vector b =
{b1, · · · , bk} ∈ Rk in a manifold space with h× w × c k.
It can then be shown that there exists a generator function
b′ = rˆ(z) that generates b′ with a distribution identical to
that of b, where b can be arbitrarily distributed and z ∈
[0, 1]k is uniformly distributed (see Appendix).
To train the NbNets in the present study, we used the
generative model of a DCGAN [37] as our face generator
r(·). This model can generate face images from vectors
z that follow a uniform distribution. Specifically, DCGAN
generates face images r(z) with a distribution that is an
approximation to that of real face images x. It can be shown
empirically that a DCGAN can generate face images of
unseen subjects with different intra-subject variations. By
using adversarial learning, the DCGAN is able to generate
face images that are classified as real face images by a
co-trained real/fake face image discriminator. Besides, the
intra-subject variations generated using a DCGAN can be
controlled by performing arithmetic operations in the ran-
dom input space [37].
3.5 Differences with DenseNet
One of the related work to NbNet is DenseNet [33], from
which the NbNet is inspired. Generally, DenseNet is based
on convolution layers and designed for object recognition,
while the proposed NbNet is based on de-convolution layers
and aimed to reconstruct face images from deep templates.
Besides, NbNet is a framework whose NbBlocks produce
output channels learned from previous blocks and neighbor
channels within the block. The output channels of NbBlocks
consist of fewer repeated and noisy channels and contain
more details for face image reconstruction than the typical
de-convolution blocks. Under the framework of NbNet, one
could build a skip-connection-like network [60], NbNet-A,
and a DenseNet -like network, NbNet-B. Note that NbNet-A
sometimes achieves a comparable performance to NbNet-B
with roughly 67% of the parameters and 54% running time
only (see model VGG-NbA-P and VGG-NbB-P in Section 4).
We leave more efficient and accurate NbNets construction as
a future work.
3.6 Implementation Details
3.6.1 Network Architecture
The detailed architecture of the D-CNN and the proposed
NbNets is shown in Table. 2. The NbNet-A and NbNet-B
show the same structure in Table. 2. However, the input of
the ConvOP in the de-convolution blocks (1)-(6) are different
(Fig. 4), where NbNet-A uses the nearest previous channels
in the same block, and NbNet-B uses all the previous chan-
nels in the same block.
3.6.2 Revisiting DCGAN
To train our NbNet to reconstruct face images from deep
templates, we first train a DCGAN to generate face images.
These generated images are then used for training. The face
images generated by the original DCGAN could be noisy
and sometimes difficult to interpret. Besides, the training
as described in [37] is often collapsed in generating high-
resolution images. To address these issues, we revisit the
DCGAN as below (as partially suggested in [42]):
• Network architecture: replace the batch normalization
and ReLU activation layer in both generator and dis-
criminator by the SeLU activation layer [61], which
performs the normalization of each training sample.
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(a) VGG-Face (b) Multi-PIE
(c) LFW (d) FRGC v2.0
(e) Color FERET
Fig. 6. Example face images from the training and testing datasets:
(a) VGG-Face (1.94M images) [23], (b) Multi-PIE (151K images, only
three camera views were used, including ‘14 0′, ‘05 0′ and ‘05 1′,
respectively) [57], (c) LFW (13,233 images) [25], [62], (d) FRGC v2.0
(16,028 images in the target set of Experiment 1) [63], and (e) Color
FERET (2,950 images) [39].
• Training labels: replace the hard labels (‘1’ for real, and
‘0’ for generated images) by soft labels in the range
[0.7, 1.2] for real, and in range [0, 0.3] for generated
images. This helps smooth the discriminator and
avoids model collapse.
• Learning rate: in the training of DCGAN, at each
iteration, the generator is updated with one batch
of samples, while the discriminator is updated with
two batches of samples (1 batch of ‘real’ and 1 batch
of ‘generated’). This often makes the discriminator
always correctly classify the images output by the
generator. To balance, we adjust the learning rate of
the generator to 2 × 10−4, which is greater than the
learning rate of the discriminator, 5× 10−5.
Example generated images were shown in Fig. 7.
3.6.3 Training Details
With the pre-trained DCGAN, face images were first gen-
erated by randomly sampling vectors z from a uniform
distribution and the corresponding face templates were
extracted. The NbNet was then updated with the generated
face images as well as the corresponding templates using
batch gradient descent optimization. This training strategy
was used to minimize the loss function L(θ) in Eq. (9),
which is an approximation of the loss function in Eq. (7).
The face template extractor we used is based on
FaceNet [14], one of the most accurate CNN models for
face recognition currently available. To ensure that the face
reconstruction scenario is realistic, we used an open-source
implementation16 based on TensorFlow17 without any mod-
ifications (model 20170512-110547).
We implemented the NbNets using MXNet18. The net-
works were trained using a mini-batch based algorithm,
Adam [64] with batch size of 64, β1 = 0.5 and β2 = 0.999.
16. https://github.com/davidsandberg/facenet
17. Version 1.4.0 from https://www.tensorflow.org
18. Version 0.1.0 from http://mxnet.io
(a) VGG-Face (b) Multi-PIE
Fig. 7. Sample face images generated from face generators trained on
(a) VGG-Face, and (b) Multi-PIE.
The learning rate was initialized to 2×10−4 and decayed by
a factor of 0.94 every 5K batches. The pixel values in the out-
put images were normalized to [−1, 1] by first dividing 127.5
and then subtracting 1.0. For the networks trained with the
pixel difference loss, we trained the network with 300K
batches, where the weights are randomly initialized using
a normal distribution with zero mean and a standard devi-
ation of 0.02. For the networks trained with the perceptual
loss [38], we trained the networks with extra 100K batches
by refining from the corresponding networks trained with
the pixel difference loss. The hardware specifications of the
workstations for the training are the CPUs of dual Intel(R)
Xeon E5-2630v4 @ 2.2 GHz, the RAM of 256GB with two
sets of NVIDIA Tesla K80 Dual GPU. The software includes
CentOS 7 and Anaconda219.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.1 Database and Experimental Setting
The vulnerabilities of deep templates under template re-
construction attacks were studied with our proposed recon-
struction model, using two popular large-scale face datasets
for training and three benchmark datasets for testing. The
training datasets consisted of one unconstrained datasets,
VGG-Face [23] and one constrained dataset, Multi-PIE [57].
• VGG-Face [23] comprises of 2.6 million face images
from 2,622 subjects. In total, 1,942,242 trainable im-
ages were downloaded with the provided links.
• Multi-PIE [57]. We used 150,760 frontal images (3
camera views, with labels ‘14 0′, ‘05 0′, and ‘05 1′,
respectively), from 337 subjects.
Three testing datasets were used, including two for
verification (LFW [25] and FRGC v2.0 [63]) and one for
identification (color FERET [39]) scenarios.
• LFW [25] consists of 13,233 images of 5,749 subjects
downloaded from the Web.
• FRGC v2.0 [63] consists of 50,000 frontal images of
4,003 subjects with two different facial expressions
(smiling and neutral), taken under different illumi-
nation conditions. A total of 16,028 images of 466
subjects (as specified in the target set of Experiment
1 of FRGC v2.0 [63]) were used.
• Color FERET [39] consists of four partitions (i.e., fa,
fb, dup1 and dup2), including 2,950 images. Com-
pared to the gallery set fa, the probe sets (fb, dup1
and dup2) contain face images of difference facial
expression and aging.
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TABLE 3
Deep template face template reconstruction models for comparison
Modela Training Dataset TrainingLoss
Testing
Dataset Training and Testing Process
VGG-Dn-P
VGG-Face
Perceptual
Loss
LFW
FRGC v2.0
color FERET
Train a DCGAN using the training dataset, and then use face
images generated from the pretrained DCGAN for training the
target D-CNN. Test the trained D-CNN using testing datasets.
VGG-NbA-P
VGG-NbB-P
VGG-Dn-M
Pixel Dif-
ference
(MAEb)
VGG-NbA-M
VGG-NbB-M
VGGr-NbB-M Directly train the target D-CNN using face images from the trainingdataset, and then test the trained D-CNN using testing datasets.
MPIE-Dn-P
Multi-PIE
Perceptual
Loss
Train a DCGAN using the training dataset, and then use face
images generated from the pretrained DCGAN for training the
target D-CNN. Test the trained D-CNN using testing datasets.
MPIE-NbA-P
MPIE-NbB-P
MPIE-Dn-M
Pixel Dif-
ference
(MAE)
MPIE-NbA-M
MPIE-NbB-M
MPIEr-NbB-M
Directly train the target D-CNN using face images from the training
dataset, and then test the trained D-CNN using testing datasets.Mixedr-NbB-M
VGG-Face
CASIA-Webface
Multi-PIE
RBF [9] LFW N/A LFW Train and test the RBF regression based method using the trainingand testing images specified in the evaluation protocol.FRGC v2.0 N/A FRGC v2.0
a Dn, NbA, and NbB denote D-CNN, NbNet-A, and NbNet-B, respectively
b MAE denotes “mean absolute error”
The face images were aligned using the five points
detected by MTCNN20 [65] and then cropped to 160 × 160
pixels. Instead of aligning images from the LFW dataset,
we used the pre-aligned deep funneled version [62]. Fig. 6
shows example images from these five datasets.
To determine the effectiveness of the proposed NbNet,
we compare three different network architectures, i.e., D-
CNN, NbNet-A, and NbNet-B, which are built using the
typical de-convolution blocks, NbBlocks A and B. All of
these networks are trained using the proposed generator-
based training strategy using a DCGAN [37] with both
pixel difference21 and perceptual loss22 [38]. To demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed training strategy, we train
the NbNet-B directly using images from VGG-Face, Multi-
PIE, and a mixture of three datasets (VGG-Face, CASIA-
Webface23 [56], and Multi-PIE). Note that both VGG-Face
and Multi-PIE are augmented to 19.2M images in our train-
ing. Examples of images generated using our trained face
image generator are shown in Fig. 7. In addition, the pro-
posed NbNet based reconstruction method was compared
with a state-of-the-art RBF-regression-based method [9]. In
contrast to the neural network based method, the RBF24
regression model of [9] used the same dataset for train-
ing and testing (either LFW or FRGC v2.0). Therefore, the
RBF-regression-based reconstruction method was expected
to have better reconstruction accuracy than the proposed
method. The MDS-based method [11] was not compared
19. https://www.anaconda.com
20. https://github.com/pangyupo/mxnet mtcnn face detection.git
21. We simply choose mean absolute error (MAE), where order k = 1.
22. To reduce the training time, we first train the network with pixel
difference loss and then fine-tune it using perceptual loss [38].
23. It consists of 494,414 face images from 10,575 subjects. We obtain
455,594 trainable images after preprocessing.
24. It was not compared in the identification task on color FERET.
here because it is a linear model and was not as good as the
RBF-regression-based method [9]. We did not compare [13],
[15] because [13] does not satisfy our assumption of black-box
template extractor and [15] requires to selecting high quality
images for training. Table 3 summarizes the 16 comparison
models used in this study for deep template inversion.
Examples of the reconstructed images of the first ten
subjects in LFW and FRGC v2.0 are shown in Fig. 8. The
leftmost column shows the original images, and the remain-
ing columns show the images reconstructed using the 16
reconstruction models. For the RBF model, every image in
the testing datasets (LFW and FRGC v2.0) has 10 different
reconstructed images that can be created using the 10 cross-
validation trials in the BLUFR protocol25 [66]. The RBF-
reconstructed images shown in this paper are those with
the highest similarity scores among these 10 different recon-
structions. The number below each image is the similarity
score between the original and reconstructed images. The
similarity scores were calculated using the cosine similarity
in the range of [−1, 1].
4.2 Verification Under Template Reconstruction Attack
We quantitatively evaluated the template security of the
target face recognition system (FaceNet [14]) under type-I
and type-II template reconstruction attacks. The evaluation
metric was face verification using the BLUFR protocol [66].
The impostor scores obtained from the original face images
were used in both of the attacks to demonstrate the efficacy
of the reconstructed face images. The genuine scores in the
type-I attack were obtained by comparing the reconstructed
images against the original images. The genuine scores in
the type-II attack were obtained by substituting one of the
25. http://www.cbsr.ia.ac.cn/users/scliao/projects/blufr/
MAI et al.: ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF FACE IMAGES FROM DEEP FACE TEMPLATES 10
Original VGG-Dn-P      VGG-NbA-P    VGG-NbB-P     VGG-Dn-M     VGG-NbA-M    VGG-NbB-M   VGGr-NbB-M      MPIE-Dn-P     MPIE-NbA-P   MPIE-NbB-P     MPIE-Dn-M    MPIE-NbA-M  MPIE-NbB-M   MPIEr-NbB-M    Mixed-NbB-M          RBF
0.79 0.78 0.84 0.73 0.66 0.75 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.74 0.41              0.42 0.43 0.48 0.64 0.45
0.70 0.77 0.81 0.52 0.72 0.65 0.69 0.85 0.82 0.79 0.73              0.57 0.67 0.33 0.55 0.55
0.73 0.78 0.78 0.73 0.78 0.79 0.76 0.83 0.87 0.88 0.62              0.82 0.81 0.65 0.68 0.60
0.63 0.71 0.78 0.49 0.61 0.72 0.57 0.75 0.75 0.81 0.57              0.70 0.77 0.41 0.64 0.61
0.83 0.85 0.81 0.73 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.86 0.78 0.80 0.71              0.73 0.72 0.48 0.80 0.53
0.74 0.72 0.79 0.68 0.63 0.67 0.44 0.60 0.72 0.75 0.55              0.51 0.63 0.35 0.47 0.58
0.81 0.81 0.82 0.73 0.78 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.78 0.88 0.52              0.71 0.68 0.73 0.69 0.60
0.66 0.72 0.80 0.67 0.60 0.70 0.64 0.74 0.67 0.79 0.49              0.70 0.73 0.58 0.57 0.59
0.62 0.66 0.76 0.72 0.42 0.54 0.55 0.67 0.62 0.63 0.52              0.20 0.51 0.30 0.64 0.55
0.78 0.79 0.80 0.65 0.65 0.78 0.59 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.65              0.57 0.79 0.67 0.52 0.71
(a) LFW
Original VGG-Dn-P      VGG-NbA-P    VGG-NbB-P     VGG-Dn-M     VGG-NbA-M    VGG-NbB-M   VGGr-NbB-M      MPIE-Dn-P     MPIE-NbA-P   MPIE-NbB-P     MPIE-Dn-M    MPIE-NbA-M  MPIE-NbB-M   MPIEr-NbB-M    Mixed-NbB-M          RBF
0.74            0.80            0.80 0.77            0.67            0.82 0.66 0.69 0.67 0.85 0.54 0.47 0.58 0.48 0.72 0.38
0.78            0.80            0.77 0.62            0.70            0.74 0.55 0.74 0.82 0.84 0.54 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.63 0.62
0.83            0.73            0.81 0.57            0.78            0.74 0.51 0.78 0.74 0.80 0.55 0.67 0.59 0.55 0.53 0.52
0.18            0.73            0.53 0.20            0.31            0.32 0.75 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.89 0.91 0.92 0.96 0.90 0.92
0.52            0.58            0.62 0.42            0.65            0.52 0.72 0.81 0.79 0.83 0.65 0.76 0.80 0.83 0.71 0.64
0.65            0.76            0.83 0.43            0.42            0.59 0.48 0.82 0.65 0.61 0.47 0.33 0.38 0.39 0.58 0.58
0.75            0.88            0.81 0.55            0.81            0.78 0.44 0.78 0.76 0.79 0.53 0.59 0.64 0.57 0.71 0.55
0.48            0.52            0.51 0.43            0.49            0.47 0.57 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.77 0.73 0.79 0.76 0.70 0.77
0.65            0.68            0.65 0.56            0.75            0.72 0.73 0.92 0.84 0.90 0.77 0.76 0.84 0.69 0.77 0.63
0.24            0.50            0.58 0.37            0.32            0.55 0.82 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.85 0.84 0.77
(b) FRGC v2.0
Fig. 8. Reconstructed face images of the first 10 subjects from (a) LFW and (b) FRGC v2.0. The original face images are shown in the first column.
Each column denotes the reconstructed face images from different models used for reconstruction. The number below each reconstructed image
shows the similarity score between the reconstructed image and the original image. The scores (ranging from -1 to 1) were calculated using the
cosine similarity. The mean verification thresholds on LFW and FRGC v2.0 were 0.51 and 0.80, respectively, at FAR=0.1%, and 0.38 and 0.64,
respectively, at FAR=1.0%.
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(b) Type-II attack
Fig. 9. ROC curves of (a) type-I and (b) type-II attacks using different reconstruction models on LFW. For the ease of reading, we only show the
curves for D-CNN, NbNet-B trained with perceptual loss, and the RBF based method. Refer to Table 4 for the numerical comparison of all models.
Note that the curves for VGG-Dn-P and MPIE-Dn-P are overlapping in (a).
TABLE 4
TARs (%) of type-I and type-II attacks on LFW for different template
reconstruction methods, where “Original” denotes results based on the
original images and other methods are described in Table 3. (best,
second best)
Attack Type-I Type-II
FAR 0.1% 1.0% 0.1% 1.0%
Original 100.00 100.00 97.33 99.11
VGG-Dn-P 84.65 96.18 45.63 79.13
VGG-NbA-P 95.20 99.14 53.91 87.06
VGG-NbB-P 94.37 98.63 58.05 87.37
VGG-Dn-M 70.22 88.35 26.22 64.88
VGG-NbA-M 79.52 94.94 30.97 68.14
VGG-NbB-M 89.52 97.75 37.09 79.19
VGGr-NbB-M 72.53 93.21 27.38 70.72
MPIE-Dn-P 85.34 95.57 41.21 77.51
MPIE-NbA-P 80.33 95.46 21.75 63.05
MPIE-NbB-P 89.25 97.69 37.30 80.67
MPIE-Dn-M 37.11 63.01 3.23 13.26
MPIE-NbA-M 50.54 78.91 6.11 33.26
MPIE-NbB-M 67.86 88.56 24.00 57.98
MPIEr-NbB-M 34.87 65.56 3.67 21.24
Mixedr-NbB-M 71.62 92.98 19.29 65.63
RBF [9] 19.76 50.55 4.41 30.70
original images in a genuine comparison (image pair) with
the corresponding reconstructed image. For benchmarking,
we report the “Original” results based on original face
images. Every genuine score of “Original” in type-I attack
was obtained by comparing two identical original images
and thus the corresponding TAR stays at 100%. The genuine
scores of “Original” in type-II attack were obtained by
the genuine comparisons specified in BLUFR protocol. The
BLUFR protocol uses tenfold cross-validation; the perfor-
mance reported here is the ‘lowest’, namely (µ − σ), where
µ and σ denote the mean and standard deviation of the
attacking accuracy obtained from the 10 trials, respectively.
4.2.1 Performance on LFW
In each trial of the BLUFR protocol [66] for LFW [25],
there is an average of 46,960,863 impostor comparisons. The
average number of testing images is 9,708. Hence, there are
9,708 genuine comparisons in a type-I attack on LFW. The
average number of genuine comparisons in a type-II attack
on LFW is 156,915; this is the average number of genuine
comparisons specified in the BLUFR protocol.
The receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curves of
type-I and type-II attacks on LFW are shown in Fig. 9.
Table 4 shows the TAR values at FAR=0.1% and FAR=1.0%,
respectively. The ROC curve of “Original” in the type-II
attack (Fig. 9b) is the system performance with BLUFR
protocol [66] based on original images.
For both type-I and type-II attacks, the proposed NbNets
generally outperform the D-CNN, where MPIE-NbA-P is
not as effective as MPIE-Dn-P. Moreover, the models trained
using the proposed strategy (VGG-NbB-M and MPIE-NbB-
M) outperform the corresponding models trained with
the non-augmented datasets (VGGr-NbB-M and MPIEr-
NbB-M). The models trained using the raw images in
VGG (VGGr-NbB-M) outperform the corresponding model
trained using the mixed dataset. All NbNets trained with the
proposed training strategy outperform the RBF regression
based method [9]. In the type-I attack, the VGG-NbA-P
model achieved a TAR of 95.20% (99.14%) at FAR=0.1%
(FAR=1.0%). This implies that an attacker has approximately
95% (or 99% at FAR=1.0%) chance of accessing the system
using a leaked template.
4.2.2 Performance on FRGC v2.0
Each trial of the BLUFR protocol [66] for FRGC v2.0 [63]
consisted of an average of 76,368,176 impostor comparisons
and an average of 12,384 and 307,360 genuine comparisons
for type-I and type-II attacks, respectively.
The ROC curves of type-I and type-II attacks on FRGC
v2.0 are shown in Fig. 10. The TAR values at FAR=0.1% and
FAR=1.0% are shown in Table 5. The TAR values (Tables 4
and 5) and ROC plots (Figs. 9 and 10) for LFW and FRGC
v2.0 cannot be directly compared, as the thresholds for LFW
and FRGC v2.0 differ (e.g., the thresholds at FAR=0.1% are
0.51 and 0.80 for LFW and FRGC v2.0, respectively). The
similarity threshold values were calculated based on the im-
postor distributions of the LFW and FRGC v2.0 databases.
It was observed that the proposed NbNets generally out-
perform D-CNN. The only exception is that the MPIE-NbA-
P was not as good as MPIE-Dn-P. Significant improvements
by using the augmented datasets (VGG-NbB-M and MPIE-
NbB-M) were observed, compared with VGGr-NbB-M and
MPIEr-NbB-M, for both the type-I and type-II attacks. All
NbNets outperform the RBF regression based method [9].
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Fig. 10. ROC curves of (a) type-I and (b) type-II attacks using different reconstruction models on FRGC v2.0. For readability, we only show the
curves for D-CNN, NbNet-B trained with perceptual loss, and the RBF based method. Refer to Table 5 for the numerical comparison of all models.
TABLE 5
TARs (%) of type-I and type-II attacks on FRGC v2.0 for different
template reconstruction methods, where “Original” denotes results
based on the original images and other methods are described in
Table 3. (best, second best)
Attack Type-I Type-II
FAR 0.1% 1.0% 0.1% 1.0%
Original 100.00 100.00 94.30 99.90
VGG-Dn-P 17.10 57.71 3.00 36.81
VGG-NbA-P 32.66 71.54 8.65 51.87
VGG-NbB-P 30.62 71.14 6.06 50.09
VGG-Dn-M 3.52 35.94 0.68 20.40
VGG-NbA-M 8.95 55.84 2.39 33.40
VGG-NbB-M 16.44 67.57 3.60 44.19
VGGr-NbB-M 6.75 55.51 4.05 36.18
MPIE-Dn-P 55.22 95.65 29.70 80.72
MPIE-NbA-P 49.75 94.41 28.46 78.71
MPIE-NbB-P 73.76 98.35 38.39 89.41
MPIE-Dn-M 12.82 47.84 10.47 38.39
MPIE-NbA-M 15.58 61.44 13.42 48.46
MPIE-NbB-M 28.48 80.67 19.85 63.04
MPIEr-NbB-M 12.72 49.53 11.75 40.59
Mixedr-NbB-M 9.65 63.82 8.15 45.10
RBF [9] 1.86 12.29 1.78 12.37
In the type-I attack, the best model, MPIE-NbB-P achieved
a TAR of 73.76% (98.35%) at FAR=0.1% (FAR=1.0%). This
implies that an attacker has a 74% (98%) chance of accessing
the system at FAR=0.1% (1.0%) using a leaked template.
4.3 Identification with Reconstructed Images
We quantitatively evaluate the privacy issue of a leaked tem-
plate extracted by target face recognition system (FaceNet
[14]) under type-I and type-II attacks. The evaluation metric
was the standard color FERET protocol [39]. The partition
fa (994 images) was used as the gallery set. For the type-
I attack, the images reconstructed from the partition fa was
used as the probe set. For the type-II attack, the probe sets (fb
with 992 images, dup1 with 736 images, and dup2 with 228
images) specified in the color FERET protocol were replaced
by the corresponding reconstructed images.
The rank-one identification rate of both type-I and type-
II attacks on color FERET are shown in Table 6. The row
values under ”Original” show the identification rate based
on the original images. It stays at 100% for the type-I attack
TABLE 6
Rank-one recognition rate (%) on color FERET [39] with partition fa as
gallery and reconstructed images from different partition as probe. The
partitions (i.e., fa, fb, dup1 and dup2) are described in color FERET
protocol [39]. Various methods are described in Table 3. (best and
second best) of rank-one identification rate in each column.
Attack Type-I Type-II
Probe fa fb dup1 dup2
VGG-Dn-P 89.03 86.59 76.77 78.51
VGG-NbA-P 94.87 90.93 80.30 81.58
VGG-NbB-P 95.57 92.84 84.78 84.65
VGG-Dn-M 80.68 74.40 62.91 65.35
VGG-NbA-M 86.62 80.44 64.95 66.67
VGG-NbB-M 92.15 87.00 75 75.44
VGGr-NbB-M 81.09 74.29 61.28 62.28
MPIE-Dn-P 96.07 91.73 84.38 85.53
MPIE-NbA-P 93.86 90.22 79.89 79.82
MPIE-NbB-P 96.58 92.84 86.01 87.72
MPIE-Dn-M 73.54 64.11 53.26 49.12
MPIE-NbA-M 72.23 64.01 51.09 44.74
MPIE-NbB-M 85.61 78.22 71.06 68.42
MPIEr-NbB-M 63.88 54.54 44.57 35.96
Mixedr-NbB-M 82.19 76.11 62.09 58.77
Original 100.00 98.89 97.96 99.12
because the corresponding similarity score are obtained by
comparing two identical images. It was observed that the
proposed NbNets outperform D-CNN with the exception
that the MPIE-Dn-P and MPIE-Dn-M slightly outperform
MPIE-NbA-P and MPIE-NbA-M, respectively. Besides, sig-
nificant improvements introduced by the proposed training
strategy were observed, comparing models VGG-NbB-M
and MPIE-NbB-M with the corresponding models trained
with raw images (VGGr-NbB-M and MPIEr-NbB-M), re-
spectively. It was observed that the best model, MPIE-NbB-
P achieves 96.58% and 92.84% accuracy under type-I and
type-II attacks (partition fb). This implies a severe privacy
issue; more than 90% of the subjects in the database can be
identified with a leaked template.
4.4 Computation Time
In the testing stage, with an NVIDIA TITAN X Pascal (GPU)
and an Intel(R) i7-6800K @ 3.40 GHz (CPU), the average
time (in microseconds) to reconstruct a single face template
with D-CNN, NbNet-A, and NbNet-B is shown in Table 7.
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TABLE 7
Average reconstruction time (ms) for a single template. The total
number of network parameters are indicated in the last column.
CPU GPU #Params
D-CNN 84.1 0.268 4,432,304
NbNet-A 62.6 0.258 2,289,040
NbNet-B 137.1 0.477 3,411,472
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We investigated the security and privacy of deep face
templates by studying the reconstruction of face images
via the inversion of their corresponding deep templates. A
NbNet was trained for reconstructing face images from their
corresponding deep templates and strategies for training
generalizable and robust NbNets were developed. Exper-
imental results indicated that the proposed NbNet-based
reconstruction method outperformed RBF-regression-based
face template reconstruction in terms of attack success rates.
We demonstrate that in verification scenario, TAR of 95.20%
(58.05%) on LFW under type-I (type-II) attack @ FAR of 0.1%
can be achieved with our reconstruction model. Besides,
96.58% (92.84%) of the images reconstruction from templates
of partition fa (fb) can be identified from partition fa in
color FERET [39]. This study revealed potential security and
privacy issues resulting from template leakage in state-of-
the-art face recognition systems, which are primarily based
on deep templates.
Our future research goals are two-fold: protecting the
system from template reconstruction attacks and improving
the proposed reconstruction. For the protection, we aim to
design a template protection scheme [17], [19], [20], [67] by
introducing user-specific randomness into deep networks
for extracting secure and discriminative deep templates.
Therefore, the extracted deep templates not only depend
on the input images, but also subject-specific keys. To
further enhance the system security, stronger anti-spoofing
techniques [4], [5], [6], [7], [8] will also be sought. For the
improvement of the reconstruction, we plan to (i) devise
a more effective reconstruction algorithm by designing a
more effective NbNet and considering the holistic contents
in face images; and (ii) study cross-system attacks using
face images reconstructed from the templates of a given face
recognition system to access a different face recognition sys-
tem (different from the one used to generate he template).
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF A FACE IMAGE GENERATOR
Suppose a face image x ∈ Rh×w×c of height h, width w, and c channels can be represented by a real vector
b = {b1, · · · , bk} ∈ Rk in a manifold space with h × w × c  k, where bi ∼ Fbi , i ∈ [1, k] and Fbi is the cumulative
distribution function of bi. The covariance matrix of b is Σb. Given a multivariate uniformly distributed random vector
z ∈ [0, 1]k consisting of k independent variables, there exists a generator function b′ = rˆ(z), b′ = {b′1, · · · , b′k} such that
b′i ∼ Fbi , i ∈ [1, k], and Σb′ ∼= Σb.
Proof. The function rˆ(·) exists and can be constructed by first introducing an intermediate multivariate normal random
vector a ∼ N (0,Σa), and then applying the following transformations:
(a) NORTA [1], [2], which transforms vector a into vector b′ = {b′1, · · · , b′k} with b′i ∼ Fbi , i ∈ [1, k] and the
corresponding covariance matrix Σb′ ∼= Σb by adjusting the covariance matrix Σa of a.
b′i = F−1bi [Φ(ai)] , i ∈ [1, k], (11)
where Φ(·) denotes the univariate standard normal cdf and F−1bi (·) denotes the inverse of Fbi . To achieve Σb′ ∼= Σb, a
matrix Λa that denotes the covariance of the input vector a can be uniquely determined [3]. If Λa is a feasible covariance
matrix (symmetric and positive semi-definite with unit diagonal elements; a necessary but insufficient condition), Σa can
be set to Λa. Otherwise, Σa can be approximated by solving the following equation:
arg min
Σa
D(Σa,Λa)
subject to Σa ≥ 0,Σa(i, i) = 1
(12)
where D(·) is a distance function [2].
(b) Inverse transformation [4] to generate a ∼ N (0,Σa) from multivariate uniformly distributed random vector z =
{z1, · · · , zk}, where zi ∼ U(0, 1), i ∈ [1, k].
a = M · [Φ−1(z1), · · · ,Φ−1(zk)]′ (13)
where M is a lower-triangular, non-singular, factorization of Σa such that MM′ = Σa, Φ−1 is the inverse of the univariate
standard normal cdf [4].
This completes the proof.
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